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CONTEMPORARY WINDS AND CURRENTS IN CRIMINAL
LAW, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO CONSTI-
TUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A
DEFENSE AND APPRECIATIONt
By SANFORD JAY ROSEN*
It is likely that in all ages men have considered their own to be
most interesting.1 However, at least ostensibly, ours, more than many,
is an age of excitement and of re-examination and re-dedication.
Passing even the great revolutions in the sciences -and technology -
those, for example, in energy development and use, communications,
cybernation, medicine, and space exploration - in social affairs, too,
ours is a revolutionary age. Sufficient illustration of this observa-
tion is found in the burgeoning, in scarcely more than a decade, of
the Civil Rights Revolution, the Ecumenical Movement, and the War
on Poverty. While the success of these and numerous other social
movements and currents can be mooted, most people, at least most of
those in the literary or library set, consider the hallmark of the present
to be change and disruption. In the criminal law, and especially criminal
procedure, this kind of movement, much of which seems significant,
is particularly obvious.
To many, the recent developments in criminal law are cause for
alarm, and numerous well-meaning lawyers and judges in this state
have argued strenuously against them. The Supreme Court and its
decisions deepening constitutional protections in the criminal area and
applying these protect-ions against the states have been subjected to
particularly powerful criticism.' Unfortunately, the present Court is a
t I am indebted to my colleague, Edward A. Tomlinson, for reading and criticiz-
ing this article and to James J. Hanks, Jr. of the Law School's class of 1967 for
assisting me in preparing its footnotes.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland.
1. Compare TEILHARD DE CHARDIN, THE PHENOMENON OP MAN 212 (1959):
"In every epoch man has thought himself at a 'turning point of history.' "
2. See, e.g., Eney, Changing Concepts of Criminal Justice, 69 TRANSAC'rONS Or
THE MD. STATE BAR ASS'N 496 (1964) ; Northrup, The Supreme Court and Criminal
Procedure, 26 MD. L. REv. 1 (1966) ; Ansel, Report of Foreman of Grand Jury 154
(September Term 1964), The Daily Record (Baltimore), Jan. 11, 1965, at 2, col. I(quoting from a charge to the Grand Jury from Judge Charles Harris of the Baltimore
Supreme Bench). Cf., e.g., Truitt v. Board of Public Works, 243 Md. 375, 412, 221
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ready target, for lately it has been especially willing to overturn its
own precedents in the area and too often by the slimmest of five to four
margins.' It is my primary purpose to undertake -in this article a broad
defense of the Court and its recent decisions, for while I share some
of the concern, for example, that the new federalization of criminal
justice sacrifices vitality that may come with diversity and experimenta-
tion, ,in ,the main, I approve of the new winds.
THE QUEST FOR THE MEANING OF DUE PROCESS
Often pursuant to federal constitutional requirements, our criminal
law, especially its procedural but also its substantive aspects, has
become increasingly sensitive of late to "humane" limitations on
governmental power. A notable aspect of this general trend has been
the ever-accelerating tendency to apply to state criminal law systems
the constitutional protections and prohibitions that heretofore were
applied only to federal criminal law. This federalization of state criminal
law ,is predominantly a phenomenon of the last decade or so,4 for
in 1833 the Supreme Court had ruled that the guarantees of the Bill
of Rights, which establish most of our constitutional limitations on
criminal procedure, protect individuals only from the federal govern-
ment and not from state and local governments.' The recent constitu-
tional limitations on state criminal proceedings have ,been, of course,
imposed pursuant to the fourteenth amendment which provides that:
"No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the law. .. ." ' It is particularly through interpretation of
the due process clause of this amendment, and lately the equal protection
clause as well, that the Supreme Court has been imposing far-reaching
strictures upon state criminal proceedings.
Over the years, four significant interpretations of the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause, as it bears upon criminal law and
procedure, have been promoted by various members of the Supreme
A.2d 370, 392 (1966) (Barnes, J., concurring) ; but cf., e.g., Marbury, Address of the
President, 71 TRANSACTIONS OF THE MD. STATE BAR ASS'N, No. 2, at 129 (1966).
3. See, e.g., Eney, supra note 2. Of course, many of the most fundamental of
the "new" decisions have been unanimous, at least as to result, or supported by more
than five of the Justices. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (news-
paper publicity and fair trial, eight to one) ; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)(right to confrontation, unanimous as to result); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963) (right to counsel, unanimous as to result).
4. In this connection it is worth remembering that the first time the Supreme
Court even assumed that free speech guarantees, such as found in the first amendment,
were limitations upon the states was in 1925 in the case of Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652 (1925). In addition, even on the federal level, active application of guarantees,
arising from the Bill of Rights, to the realm of criminal law is comparatively recent.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (sixth amendment includes the
right of federal indigent defendants to be furnished counsel at trial) ; Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (exclusion of the fruits of unreasonable searches and
seizures).
5. Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. (Emphasis added.)
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Court and others.7 Until recently, the prevailing view of the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause was that it should be interpreted and
applied "by the gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion." 8
As Justice Cardozo viewed the process, in Palko v. Connecticut,9
the protections afforded by the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause are too complex to tame or describe for all time. As a starting,
but certainly not an ending point for interpretation, however, Justice
Cardozo believed that the due process clause should be read to impose
on the states at least some version of the "immunities that are valid
as against the federal government by force of the -specific pledges of
particular amendments [among the first eight] and which have been
found to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty ... ." " Under
this view, individual rights (whether enumerated in the Bill of Rights
or not), which are "not of the very essence of a scheme of ordered
liberty," " are not protected 'by the fourteenth amendment against
state intrusion. However,
we reach a different plane of social and moral values when we
pass to the privileges and immunities that have been taken over
from the earlier articles of the federal bill of rights and brought
within the Fourteenth Amendment by a process of absorption.
These in their origin were effective against the federal government
alone. If the Fourteenth Amendment has absorbed them, the
process of absorption has had its source in the belief that neither
liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed. 2
Thus, according to Justice Cardozo, the states are prohibited from
violating "those 'fundamental principles of liberty and justice [again
whether enumerated in the Bill of Rights or not] that lie at the base
of all our civil and political institutions,' " " such as freedom of speech
and the right not to be condemned without a fair trial or hearing.
This so-called "ordered liberty" concept was subsequently reformulated
by Justice Frankfurter in Adamson v. California.4 According to him:
[The Fourteenth] Amendment neither comprehends the specific
provisions by which the founders deemed it appropriate to restrict
7. Before these are formulated (in simplified fashion), it is advisable to dis-
pose of a fifth interpretation, one which would limit the words "due process of law"
to such processes as are actually provided by law. Obviously, this is the very minimum
that the words might be taken to mean. I know of no Supreme Court Justice who has
placed this minimal gloss upon the fourteenth amendment; certainly none appears to
have done so in the Twentieth Century.
In an early case involving the fifth amendment's due process clause, in fact,
the Court said that: "It is manifest that it was not left to the legislative power to
enact any process which might be devised. The article is a restraint on the legislative,
as well as on the executive and judicial powers of the government, and cannot be so
construed as to leave congress free to make any process 'due process of law,' by its
mere will." Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.)
272, 276 (1856).
8. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104 (1877) ; see also Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
9. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
10. Id. at 324-25.
11. Id. at 325.
12. Id. at 326.
13. Id. at 328.
14. 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
1967]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
the federal government nor is it confined -to them. The Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has an independent potency,
precisely as does the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
in relation to the Federal Government ... Judicial review of
that guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment inescapably imposes
upon this Court an exercise of judgment upon the whole course of
the proceedings [appealed from] in order to ascertain whether they
offend those canons of decency and fairness which express the
notions of justice of English speaking peoples even toward those
charged with the most heinous offenses. 5
It was also in the Adamson case that Justice Black, joined by
Justice Douglas, vehemently dissented from the step-by-step "ordered
liberty" interpretation."6 In Justice Black's opinion, the "ordered
liberty" concept left the Justices too much at large to impose their own
views, periodically expanding and contracting the protective content
of due process ;17 moreover, Justice Black insisted that the actual or
ascertainable purpose of the fourteenth amendment was to incorporate
and impose upon the states the first eight amendments and whatever
protections they hold, in toto. Thus, the Black view is characterized as
the "incorporation" theory.
To be distinguished from the "incorporation" theory is what might
be labeled the "incorporation plus" theory, which describes the position
originally adopted by Justices Murphy and Rutledge. Generally accept-
ing "incorporation," they insisted, however, that additional flexibility
was contemplated in the due process clause to take account of the
"Occasions [that] may arise where a proceeding falls so far short of
conforming to fundamental standards of procedure as to warrant
constitutional condemnation in terms of due process despite absence
of a specific provision in the Bill of Rights." 18 More recently, Justice
Douglas has, on increasing occasion, parted company with Justice Black
as to the meaning of various protections found among the first eight
amendments,' 9 and, in essence, may have also adopted the "incorpora-
15. Id. at 66-67. See also Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); Frankfurter, Memorandum on "Incorporation" of theBill of Rights into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 78 HARV.
L. Rev. 746 (1965). Justice Harlan is now the main advocate of this view. See, e.g.,Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 408-09 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring in the result) ;
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 14-33 (1964) (Harlan and Clark, J.J., dissenting).
16. 332 U.S. at 71-75. (Black, J., dissenting). See also, e.g., Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting). Compare Justice Black's
reading, in Adamson, of the relevant "history" of the fourteenth amendment, with
Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The
Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1949).
17. Notably, Justice Black has never really explained the scope or meaning tobe given to the fifth amendment's due process clause which, of course, would be incor-porated into the fourteenth amendment under his approach. See SUTHERLAND, CON-
STITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA: ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF ITS FUNDAMENTAL IDEAS530-31 (1965) ; but see United States v. Wade, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 4597, 4606-07 (U.S.
June 12, 1967) (Black, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
18. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 124 (1947) (Murphy and Rutledge, J.J.,
dissenting).
19. See, e.g., Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) (what constitutes an unrea-
sonable search and seizure?).
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tion plus" position by finding the necessary flexibility in the ninth
amendment2" and in the "penumbras" of other amendments and con-
stitutional provisions that deal with personal liberty.2"
The fourth approach to the meaning of "due process of law"
occupies a position somewhat between that of the "incorporation"
and "ordered liberty" theories. Articulated primarily by Justice Bren-
nan, but also accepted by, among others, Chief Justice Warren and for-
mer Justice Goldberg,22 it has been denominated the "absorption" or
"selective incorporation" theory. Like the modern "ordered liberty"
concept, it claims its origins in Justice Cardozo's decision in Palko v.
Connecticut.13 By means of the "'process of absorption, the [Supreme]
Court holds that certain fundamental guarantees of the Bill of Rights
are made obligatory on the States through the [due process clause of
the] Fourteenth Amendment,"2 " while. the less important guarantees
in the first eight amendments are excluded ; for example, the seventh
amendment's guarantee of jury trials -in all:civil cases involving more
than twenty dollars. Under -this approach, a right absorbed from one
of the first eight amendments necessarily comes with its full sweep
and vigor into the fourteenth amendment and is enforced against the
states according to essentially the same standards as it is enforced
against the federal government. 25  •
The "absorption" theory assures somewhat more certainty than
the "ordered liberty" theory while avoiding some of the inflexible and
inconvenient results of the "incorporation" .theory. It differs from
"ordered liberty" in that some of the guarantees in the first eight
amendments are applied, as such, against the states; it differs from
"incorporation" in that not all of those guarantees are so applied.
In another respect "absorption" has 'greater similarity to "ordered
liberty," or at least to ",incorporation plus," than to "incorporation,"
for it does not exclude the possibility that there, may be an essence of'the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment that is independent
of the guarantees expressly stated in the first eight amendments.26
20. "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
21. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S..479 (1965).
22. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 410 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring);
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) ; Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 154-60 (1961);
Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the States, 36 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 761 (1961) ; Henkin,
"Selective Incorporation" in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74 (1963).
23. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
24. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 414 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
25. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 410 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring);
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963). See
also Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). (When federal constitutional rights
are involved, a federal and not the state test of harmless error applies.) The advocates
of the "ordered liberty" approach insist that even when a right found among the first
eight amendments is to be protected against state infringement, the states are not
necessarily bound by the same standards for assuring the right as is the federal govern-
ment. See, e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 408-09 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring
in the result; sixth amendment right to confrontation) ; Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23,
44-46 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring; fourth amendment unreasonable search and
seizure). Of course, under the absorption approach, states are free to impose standards
that are higher than the federal ones. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
26. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (by implication) ; United
States v. Wade, 35 U.S.L. WFXK 4597, 4606-07 (U.S. June 12, 1967) (Black, J.,
1967]
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So far as ultimate consequences are concerned, it appears that the
Supreme Court's recent decisions in the field of constitutional criminal
procedure have been pursuant to the "absorption" theory. Many of the
Court's startling new decisions have thus been new only to the extent
that limitations long placed on federal criminal proceedings and police
activities are now being imposed on the states as well.
However, with each new imposition of a federal standard, state
independence of action, important to the maintenance of a viable
system of federalism, is cumulatively limited. Without doubt, the
states are being restrained as never before with respect to the manner
in which they may carry on police work and conduct criminal proceed-
ings; concomitantly, the extent to which states may function as
laboratories for social experiments in this area has 'been significantly
curtailed. But the Justices are obviously aware that their decisions
are compelling our society to relinquish much that -is good. Just
as obviously, they must believe that the price is more than made
up in gain. The profit envisoned by them engages some of the
fundamental postulates of our civilization and our notions of fairness
and propriety. Before turning to some of the particular major recent
developments and the values that they involve, it is appropriate to
focus attention on the basic question of why, as individuals and as
a society, we are or should be concerned with due process of law,
particularly procedural due process, however defined. The question
is likely rhetorical, for we all have some visceral sense that we should
be concerned. If it is not rhetorical on this level, it should be - Dick
Tracy and Little Orphan Annie to the contrary notwithstanding.
WHY DUE PROCESS?
To begin, we cherish and refine the safeguards that collectively
add up to procedural due process of law to assure that the likelihood
of convicting and punishing the innocent is minimized and to assure
'that truth is the main pursuit of criminal proceedings. For public
confidence that, except for occasional and unavoidable mistakes, only
the guilty are convicted and punished is essential to a free and demo-
cratic society." As Justice Frankfurter said so well: "The history of
liberty has largely been the history of observance of procedural safe-
guards."2
dissenting in part and concurring in part and accusing the majority of having adopted
an ordered liberty type of approach) ; Stovall v. Denno, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 4610, 4613
(U.S. June 12, 1967); Id. at 4614 (Black, J., dissenting); cf., e.g., Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486-99 (1965). It should be noted that there may be some
merit to the recent observation of Dean Louis H. Pollak of the Yale Law School that:
[T]he doctrinal positions so heatedly espoused by the various Justices back in
the late 1940s will become a largely academic exercise. The fit analogy will then
become, as Professor Paul A. Freund once prophesied, the anecdote of the Irish
cleric who was asked by a parishioner what the difference was between the cheru-
bim and seraphim, and who answered, "I think that there was once a difference
between them, but they have made it up."
2 POLLAK, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE SUPREME COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
179 (1966), quoting FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 43 (1950).
27. See BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932); FRANK & FRANK, NOT
GUILTY (1961).
28. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943) ; or as Justice Brandeis
put it, "[I]n the development of our liberty, insistence upon procedural regularity has
[VOL. XXVII
19671 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 109
But some procedural safeguards, for example, the rule that ille-
gally seized evidence ,is inadmissible in criminal proceedings,29 often
have the effect, so far as the defendant is concerned, of freeing the 'guilty
rather than protecting the -innocent from unwarranted conviction."0
Sometimes the Supreme Court employs a procedural device -to 'guar-
antee a more general substantive right to all the members of our society.
Thus, illegally seized evidence is excluded from state as well as from
federal criminal trials -in order to preserve thegeneral right of privacy -
the freedom of each inhabitant' of this country from 'unreasonable
intrusion by the government into his home or person, which has been
best described as "the right to be let alone. ' 31 And it is to be antici-
pated that further constitutional or other 'adjustment will be made
in the near future to protect us from abusive wiretapping and electronic
eavesdropping or surveillance, as well as from physical searches and
seizures.3 2 Moreover, the Court's recent actions in extending the fifth
been a large factor." Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 477 (1921) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). Speaking for the Court, Justice Fortas recently observed that:
Due process of law is the primary and indispensable foundation of individual
freedom. It is the basic and essential term in the social compact which defines
the rights of the individual and delimits the powers which the State may exercise.
As Mr. Justice Frankfurter has said: "The history of American freedom is, in
no small measure, the history of procedure." But, in addition, the procedural
rules which have been fashioned from the generality of due process are our best
instruments for the distillation and evaluation of essential facts from the con-
flicting welter of data that life and our adversary methods present. It is these in-
struments of due process which enhance the possibility that truth will emerge
from the confrontation of opposing versions and conflicting data. "Procedure is
to law what 'scientific method' is to science." In re Gault, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 1439-
40 (1967).
29. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) ; Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914).
30. See, e.g., Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963).
31. CooLxy, TORTs 29 (2d ed. 1888) ; see Comment, 26 MD. L. REv. 249 (1966).
The Court has gone so far in this area as to overturn its 5 to 4 decision in Frank v.
Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959), which permitted the government to punish those who
refuse to allow health inspectors to enter their homes without a warrant or a showing
of probable cause. Camara v. Municipal Court, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 4517 (U.S. June 5,
1967) ; Sea v. Seattle, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 4522 (U.S. June 5, 1967), where the Court
ruled that the fourth amendment bars warrantless, nonemergency inspections of resi-
dential and commercial premises by city health or fire inspectors without the occupant's
consent; but warrants for such inspecions need not.be based on reasonable cause to
believe that there is a violation on the premises sought to be inspected; warrants can
be based on the reasonableness of the health and safety need to conduct periodic, area-
wide inspections. But see Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), where the
Court, by a vote of 5 to 4, declined to overturn its earlier decision in Breithaupt v.
Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957), which permits involuntary, but sanitary withdrawal of
blood from the driver of an automobile involved in an accident when the police officer
investigating has ample reason to believe that the driver was under the influence
of alcohol. See Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 87 S. Ct. 1642 (1967),
where the Court overturned the rule that, in conducting a search, the police may not
seize "mere evidence" as distinguished from contraband or fruits and instrumentalities
of the crime.
32. See, e.g., BENTON, THE PRIVACY INVADERS 15-18, 151-71 (1964); PACKARD,
THE NAKED SOCIETY chs. 4, 9 (1964). Long ago, in Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438 (1928), the Court ruled, 5 to 4, that wiretapping does not violate the fourth
amendment. Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act, 48 Stat. 1103 (1934),
47 U.S.C. § 605 (1965), however, now renders telephonic wiretapping illegal (even
when done pursuant to state law) if the intercepted communications are "divulged."
See, e.g., Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957). In addition, recently the
Supreme Court ruled that the use of spike-mikes and other such instruments that
"trespass into a person's home or habitat" violate the fourth amendment, and evidence
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amendment's protection against self-incrimination,3" and in imposing
it upon the states, provide still another example of the use of a pro-
cedural limitation, designed not merely to protect the innocent but also
to protect the integrity of our judicial system and of the individual in
our society.34
Although not directly related to the question "why due process ?,"
it is noteworthy that in addition to the use of procedural devices to
guarantee the right to privacy, there is a significant movement in the
criminal law, partly under this privacy banner, to stake out entire
areas of consensual and non-violent human conduct as being beyond
criminal or other negative sanction by the government." It is possible
that these contractions of the criminal law are actuated, in addition, by
a healthy recognition that law has only a limited function in any society
and that it should condemn only forms of behavior which seriously
endanger the social fabric. Of course, this may be just another way
of saying that the law is more and more recognizing a right to privacy.
resulting from such intrusion must be excluded from criminal proceedings. See, e.g.,Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).Although it had the opportunity to do so during this Term, the Court hasthus far declined to expressly. overrule Olmstead and other such cases, for example,Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963) and On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S.747 (1952), which uphold the introduction of incriminating evidence resulting from the
wiring of undercover agents and informers for sound. See Hoffa v. United States, 385U.S. 293 (1966) ; Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966). Very recently,however, the Court did rule that New York's ex parte, permissive eavesdropping
statute was unconstitutionally broad and therefore violated the fourth and fourteenth
amendments. The Court found the statute constitutionally deficient because it did notrequire, for the issuance of an eavesdropping order, particularity with respect to the
crime suspected and the conversations sought and a showing of exigent circumstancesto justify an unconsented to and secret eavesdropping by the police; nor did itsufficiently limit or control the period of the order's effectiveness by providing for atermination date of the order once the conversation sought was seized. "In short,"the Court wrote, "the statute's blanket grant of permission to eavesdrop is without
adequate judicial supervision or protective procedures." Berger v. New York, 35U.S.L. WEEK 4649, 4654 (U.S. June 12, 1967). In concurring, Justice Douglas statedthat he joined "the opinion of the Court because at long last it overrules sub silentioOlmstead v. United States . . . and its offspring and brings wiretapping and other
electronic eavesdropping fully within the purview of the Fourth Amendment." Id.
at 4655. The Court has, moreover, granted certiorari in another case raising
electronic eavesdropping issues. Katz v. United States, 386 U.S. 954 (1967). In
addition, the Congress has before it the administration's Right to Privacy Bill of1967, S. 928, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). Passage would likely lead to effective
and salutary regulation of wiretapping and other electronic eavesdropping. Onefurther development is worthy of note. The Draft Constitution, recommended by theConstitutional Convention Commission of Maryland, provides in Section 1.08 of theDeclaration of Rights that: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures and in their
oral and other communications against unreasonable interceptions shall not be violated."
INTERIM REPORT Op THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMMISSION: MARYLAND1967 (May 26, 1967) pp. 2, 35-36 (emphasis supplied).33. See, e.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); Malloy v. Hogan, 378U.S. 1 (1964); Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52 (1964). See also
note 77 infra.34. Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 415 (1966) : "[T]he basicpurposes that lie behind the privilege against self-incrimination do not relate to pro-tecting the innocent from conviction, but rather to preserving the integrity of a judicial
system in which even the guilty are not to be convicted unless the prosecution 'shouldersthe entire load.' " See also In re Gault, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 1454 (1967) ; GRISWOLD, TIng
FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY (1955).35. For a highly relevant discussion of the appropriate function of criminal law
and its intersection with morals, see Dworkin, Lord Devlin and the Enforcement ofMorals, 75 YALE L.J. 786 (1966).
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Thus, for example, the state of Connecticut was recently barred by
the Supreme Court from prohibiting the operation of a Planned
Parenthood Clinic that serviced married adults. 6 And the influential
American Law Institute has, in its Model Penal Code, adopted the
position that private sexual acts, whether heterosexual or homosexual,
between consenting adults should be insulated from governmental
interferenceY7 One state, Illinois, has gone far to approach this position
through legislation.8
In one other significant fashion, the right to privacy is being
further preserved of late. Under federal law, citizens are finding redress,
in damages and injunctions, for aggravated invasions of their privacy
by police and other public officials." Very recently, in fact, as a result
of a series of excessive and unconscionable searches of hundreds of
homes and persons in Baltimore's Negro community (by a police
department that was devoid of restraint in its quest for two suspected
"cop-killers"), the Baltimore City Police Department was enjoined, in
a far-reaching opinion by Judge Sobeloff, from conducting searches
not based upon "probable cause."'40
The new tendency to make affirmative remedies available against
police excesses illuminates another theme present in the current criminal
law and procedure reform movement. This consideration might be
labeled "how to police the police." The point is made most clear when
we reconsider the Supreme Court's decisions that illegally seized evi-
dence, evidence produced -through an unreasonable search, is now
excluded from state as well as from federal criminal proceedings.4'
The Court rendered this decision despite the fact that it is advertent
to the difficulty of ruling, as Justice Cardozo put it, that ".the criminal
is to go free because the constable has blundered. ' 42 The Court was
driven to this result because no other means of assuring the critical
right to privacy against unwarranted or unreasonable police searches
and seizures had proven effective. Furthermore, the Court was of
the view that it is more than unseemly to permit the government to
enforce the law by overt resort to admittedly illegal actions - and a
search that is not conducted upon "probable cause" 43 is admitted by
all to be illegal.44
36. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Cf. McLaughlin v. Florida,
379 U.S. 184 (1964) (Florida law punishing interracial fornication with a heavier
penalty than intraracial fornication voided); Loving v. Virginia, 35 U.S.L. WEEK
4679 (U.S. June 12, 1967) (Virginia anti-miscegenation law voided).
37. MODEL PENAL CoDE art. 213 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
38. ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, §§ 11-2, 11-3 (1961).
39. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), involving 42 U.S.C. § 1983(1965) ; Dombroski v. Eastland, 87 S. Ct. 1425 (1967).
40. Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966).
41. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) ; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
42. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926).
43. The Supreme Court's present definition of probable cause appears to require
that amount of evidence which would "warrant a man of reasonable caution" to
believe that a felony had been committed. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162(1925). While the "quantum" of information giving rise to probable cause will be
"measured by the facts of the particular case," it must be more than a "vague suspicion."
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479, 484 (1963). See also Warden, Mary-
land Penitentiary v. Hayden, 87 S. Ct. 1642, 1645-46 (1967).
44. In 1949, the Supreme Court first ruled that "unreasonable searches and
seizures" violate due process of law under the fourteenth amendment when conducted
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Consider, if you will, the consequences of the government's own
demonstrated contempt for law. Is one consequence not likely to be gen-
eralized contempt for law? Are the causes of our recent "long, hot sum-
mers" divorced from the Negro community's sensing that the police
are unrestricted :by ,law when dealing with ghetto-dwellers and Negroes?
If government lawlessness is permitted, do we not risk the dangers
Justice Brandeis warned of ,long ago when he said:
Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government
officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are
commands to the citizen. In a government of laws, existence of
the government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law
scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent
teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its
example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a law
breaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become
a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the
administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means -
to declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to
secure the conviction of a private criminal - would bring terrible
retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should
resolutely set its face.45
Upon ,this base, the need to foster respect for law, can be -found support
not only for much of our system of procedural due process, but also
for 'the most sophisticated arguments favoring establishment of civilian
police review boards. Who, indeed, is to police the police?46
Related to the need for policing the police and for inculcating
respect for law -is the importance of having our systems of criminal
law satisfy not merely the reality, 'but also the appearance, of fair-
ness.47 We must pause to absorb this thought, for many will find it
at least initially shocking; yet it is deeply rooted in the fundamental
by state police officials. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). It was not until 1961,
however, that the Court ruled that the fruits of such searches must be excluded from
state criminal proceedings. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Later the Court
ruled that the same standards of excludability that are applicable in the federal courts
are applicable in the state courts, Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), although a
state is free to impose a higher standard of excludability if it chooses. See Cooper v.
California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967). Still later it was held that the exclusionary rule is
not to be retrospective in application. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
45. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting) ; see Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1959).
46. See generally Murphy, Judicial Review of Police Methods in Law Enforce-
ment: The Problem of Compliance by Police Department, 44 TExAs L. Rev. 939
(1966) ; Bickel, Judicial Review of Police Methods in Law Enforcement: The Role
of the Supreme Court of the United States, 44 TEXAS L. Rxv. 954 (1966).
47. "There is a tremendous psychological need for the appearance of justice which
a fair trial creates in the public mind." Arnold, The Criminal Trial as a Symbol of
Public Morality, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME 137, 140 (Howard ed. 1965).
See, e.g., Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954), where, dealing with judicial
bias, Justice Frankfurter said: "Justice must satisfy the appearance of justice." See
also In re Gault, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 1443 (1967).
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premises of our pluralistic society, which accepts and understands
the relativity of truth and, indeed, knows that truth may be illusion
and illusion, truth.4 8 Even in the criminal process (as -in most of our
institutions) the most important decisions we make, therefore, are
those according to which we decide how to decide. And in structuring
and operating the system, the quest for truth, or that which actually
transpired on a particular occasion, is only one goal that we pursue.
Among other things, we also -seek public morality and expiation of
our sins, much as we do in a passion play.49 Confidence in the substance
of the system 'is thus wedded to confidence in its appearance or illusion."
If this 'broader function is not served by a system of justice, to the
satisfaction of the population it services, that system is overthrown
as soon as time and power permit. The Black Panther Movement in
the South may be seen, in part, as a frustrated reaction to the inability
of Negroes in that -section of the country to gain even -the appearance
of fairness in legal proceedings.
The importance of "maintaining appearances" and of symbolism
in criminal procedure may 'be illustrated by our jury system. It is a
truthseeking device, but it is also a hedge against the power or caprice
of the official state and a petty legislature to assure the continual par-
ticipation by the people and application of the public conscience in
the administration of justice.5' Admittedly it is an imperfect instru-
ment; surely this is true of its utility in ascertaining truth. Neverthe-
less, we tolerate, perhaps even adulate, the jury system despite its
defects. The Supreme Court, in fact, recently indicated some prefer-
ence for the jury system, even over judges, as fact finders in criminal
contempt proceedings involving risk of serious penalty.5 2 Can it be
that we consider the imperfections of jury trial to be its perfection?
In -more primitive times, -instead of trial by jury, the various
truthseeking devices of trial by ordeal were employed.5 3 If it were
demonstrated that these devices were considerably more accurate in
48. See, e.g., PIRANDELLO, NAKED MASKS: FivE PLAYS (Bentley ed. 1952).
49. See generally Arnold, op. cit. supra note 47.
50. By this statement, disagreement is not necessarily intended with the view
recently expressed by Justice Fortas with respect to prosecution concealment of in-
formation: "The State's obligation is not to convict, but to see that, so far as possible,
truth emerges. This is also the ultimate statement of its responsibility to provide a
fair trial under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Giles v.
Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 98 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring) ; see also In re Gault,
87 S. Ct. 1428, 1439-40 (1967) (quoted supra note 28).
51. Cf., e.g., Arnold, op. cit. supra note 47, at 143; Jackson, The Lottery, in
TH MAGIC OF SHIRLEY JACKSON 137 (Hyman ed. 1966).
52. See Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966) ; United States v. Barnett,
376 U.S. 681 (1964). Cf. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965) (upholding
application of FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(a) requiring government consent to defendant's
waiver of jury trial). Recently the Court granted certiorari in a case raising the ques-
tion of whether a defendant has a fourteenth amendment right to a jury trial on a state
criminal contempt charge resulting in a two-year prison sentence. Bloom v. Illinois,
87 S. Ct. 1347 (1967).
53. See, e.g., PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OP T114 COMMON LAW 113-15
(5th ed. 1956) ; II POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY or ENGLISH LAW 598-99 (1923).
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determining truth than is our jury system, we would nonetheless
recoil from the proposal that the jury system, imperfect though it is,
be replaced with trial by ordeal. Why? Because trial by ordeal is
considered uncivilized or inhumane.
As has often been said, one of the marks of a civilization - one
of the ways to test its maturity - is its system of criminal justice.
We must therefore assume, and I think we all realize it, that absent the
most egregious of circumstances, there are procedures that we shun,
regardless of validity as truth-seeking devices, on the simple but com-
plex ground that our society just should not, and therefore cannot,
approve such activities. Thus, there are procedures that we do not
institutionalize because they are inhumane; concomitantly, those pro-
cedures we do institutionalize must be responsive to a healthy sense
of humanity. These limitations, first an overt and second an inarticulate
command of civilization, have ramifications throughout our system
of criminal justice; this is all the more understandably so because each
individual, unless he represses or otherwise masks or ignores the
insight, is able to project himself into the role of one who is called
as accused before the bar of justice. Each of us hopes, I think, that
if he were the accused, the government would be restrained from per-
forming its will upon him, untrammelled by considerations of fairness
and morality.5 4
HASN'T SOCIETY ANY RIGHTS?
For all these worthy considerations of protecting the innocent,
maintaining a free and pluralistic society, promoting respect for law,
and acceding to the demands of humane civilization and enlightened
self-interest, it appears to be a fact that crime is increasing and at an
alarming rate,5 5 and it is likely to continue increasing. Moreover, it
cannot be ignored that to function properly and avoid anarchy or in-
tolerable disorder, a society (and its systems of criminal justice) must
not merely be humane and protective of the innocent, but must also
protect itself and its members from the ravages of crime and lawless-
ness. Society must do a competent job of defining crime, of detecting
and fighting it, and of restraining, isolating, deterring and/or rehabili-
tating criminals.56 Obviously, therefore, society must provide for the
orderly conviction of the guilty.
54. Compare the statement attributed by the recent play and motion picture,
"A Man for All Seasons" to Sir Thomas More who, when he was being cajoled to
arrest, without lawful cause, Richard Rich, ultimately the instrument Of his undoing,
said that he would even "give the Devil the benefit of law for my own safety's sake."
55. In the entire United States, major crimes (murder, robbery, rape, aggravated
assault, burglary, larceny of $50 or more, and auto theft) rose 37.7 per cent from
1959 through 1964. Computed from figures in U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 148 (1966). See generally THE CHALLENGE OF
CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (Report by the President's Commission on Law Enforce-
ment and Administration of Justice, 1967).
56. See generally INBAU, Law Enforcement, the Courts, and Individual Civil
Liberties, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME 97 (Howard ed. 1965). Of course, there
is one other traditional function of criminal law: retribution. But see Rudolf v.
Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963) (Goldberg, Douglas, and Brennan, J.J., dissenting
from the denial of certiorari).
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There are those who argue that the current judicial tendency to
refine and extend constitutional limitations and to impose them on
state criminal proceedings promotes an increase in crime itself."
Such contentions are old hat, dubious old hat.5" Even if the decisions of
the past few years were overturned, little would be accomplished to
assure a decrease in crime. As the President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice recently appreciated, the
elimination of the root causes of crime, such as poverty and the
general disorientation of the individual in our permissive and mass-
nuclear age, and the improvement of police techniques and personnel
are more relevant points upon which to focus social and intellectual
energies.5
Although the opponents of the new constitutional and other de-
velopments overstate their case, the proponents are not entirely inno-
cent of this malady. Since the new decisions are new in their effect,
notably on state practices and procedures, they are obviously disruptive,
and the disruption is magnified by the Supreme Court's expansion
in 1963 of the scope of collateral review available in federal courts on
writs of habeas corpus brought by state prisoners, even well after
their state convictions are final.6 ° It must for all time be admitted that
57. See, e.g., INBAU, op. cit. supra note 56.
58. Kamisar, When the Cops Were Not "Handcuffed," N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1965,
p. 34 (Magazine).
59. THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SocIETY, op. cit. supra note 55. See
also Goldberg, Equality and Governmental Action, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 205 (1964);
REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRA-
TION oV JuSTIcE (1963) ; REPORT OV THE STATE'S ATTORNEY'S OFFicE or BALTIMORE
CITY UNDER THE ADMINISTRATION OF WILLIAM J. O'DONNELL AND CHARLES E.
MOYLAN, JR. 3-8 (Jan. term 1964 to Jan. term 1965).
60. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) ; Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
The Court has recognized the problem and, despite criticism by many who
approve the limitations now being placed on state criminal proceedings, (see, e.g.,
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 640 (1965) (Black and Douglas, J.J., dissenting)
has ameliorated the dislocation by applying some of its new decisions prospectively,
thereby not reopening earlier final convictions.
In Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), the Court refused to apply
retroactively its holding in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), that illegally-seized
evidence is not admissible in state criminal trials. The Court in Linkletter found that,
since "the Constitution neither prohibits nor requires retrospective effect," the Court
would "weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of
the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will
further or retard its operation." 381 U.S. at 629.
In Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966), the Court
declined to apply retroactively its holding in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965),
that adverse comment on a defendant's failure to testify in a state criminal trial violates
the privilege against self-incrimination. Taking the Linkletter guidelines as its
"starting point," the Court in Tehan concluded that the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination is not "an adjunct to the ascertainment of truth," as opposed
to the right to counsel or the exclusion of a coerced confession, which are inextricably
bound up in the trial, the purpose of which is the "determination of truth." 381 U.S.
at 416.
In Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966), the Court refused to apply
retroactively either its holding in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), that
denial of counsel to an accused person who is no longer the object of a "general
inquiry" but who has become the "particular suspect" violates the sixth and fourteenth
amendments, or its holding in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), that, without
adequate procedural safeguards, police interrogation after a person has been taken into
custody and the introduction in evidence of any resulting statements violate the fifth
amendment. The Court in Johnson declared that Escobedo and Miranda "encompass
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it is not a wholly satisfactory answer to the critics of the new rulings
to say that federal police agencies, such as the FBI, have long labored
under many of the "new" constitutional disabilities without any dis-
cernible loss of effectiveness."' Not only do the federal police agencies,
particularly the FBI, have superior personnel, but, with the exception
of the District of Columbia Police Department, they are not usually
charged with the awesome burden of general law enforcement. Federal
offenses are, in the main, pretty specialized and fancy affairs not involv-
ing the mundane work-a-day problems of general maintenance of social
order. And federal police decisions ordinarily are not the kind of spur of
the moment decisions that must 'be made daily by the patrolman on the
beat. Despite the disruption of state practice and procedure, however,
the new restrictions conform to our fundamental postulates and there-
fore are mostly beneficial. Moreover, if not avoided by low visibility
subterfuge,6 2 they will require and/or contribute to desirable up-grading
of police personnel and practices. As some of the more far-sighted state
prosecutors have declared, -unable to rely upon unsophisticated "knock-
on-the-door" means of adducing evidence, -the police will have to de-
velop and refine sophisticated and scientific methods of criminal investi-
gation.6" Crude shortcuts -have been ruled out.
THE ADVERSARY-AcCUSATORY SYSTEM6 4
As already noted, the last few years can be described as spectacu-
lar to the extent that events have required alteration of past practices
in criminal procedure, though not necessarily past theories. Among
the more far-reaching of the recent developments 'have been those in
the area of the right to legal counsel in criminal proceedings.
For several decades, all indigent criminal defendants accused
of serious crimes have had the absolute right to effective representa-
tion by appointed counsel in federal court trials, unless they voluntarily,
situations in which the danger is not necessarily as great as when the accused is sub-
jected to overt and obvious coercion." 384 U.S. at 730.
Most recently, in Stovall v. Denno, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 4610 (U.S. June 12,
1967), the Court ruled that its decisions in United States v. Wade, 35 U.S.L. WEEK
4597 (U.S. June 12, 1967) and Gilbert v. California, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 4614 (U.S.
June 12, 1967), holding that a lineup is a critical stage in a criminal proceeding at
which the right to a counsel attaches, are not to be applied retroactively. Retroactive
review of the general fairness of the proceedings, however, was left open.
It is notable that the Court of Appeals of Maryland as well has declined to
give retrospective application to its decision voiding convictions by juries from which
non-theists have been systematically excluded. Schowgurow v. State, 240 Md. 121,
213 A.2d 475 (1965) ; see Comment, 26 MD. L. Rxv. 272 (1966).
61. See generally, e.g., INBAU, op. cit. supra note 56, at 112.
62. Cf. Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low
Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543 (1960).
63. See, e.g., The Evening Sun, June 14, 1966, p. B-30 (Reported comments of
Baltimore City State's Attorney Charles E. Moylan, Jr., on Miranda and Escobedo
decisions) ; REPORT OF THE STATE's ATTORNEY'S OFFIcE OF BALTIMORE CITY, op. cit.
supra note 59, at 5 (implied). See U.S. Dep't of Justice Press Release, March 24, 1967.
(Attorney General Ramsey Clark announced approval of $603,315 in grants to 16 state
and local criminal justice projects) ; U.S. Dep't of Justice Press Release, March 22,
1967 (fellowship grants for policemen under the Law Enforcement Assistance
Program).
64. See generally KAMISAR, Equal Justice in the Gatehouse and Mansions of
American Criminal Procedure, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME 1, 12-13 (1965).
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knowingly, and intelligently waive the appointment. 5 In 1932, this
requirement was first imposed in a state case involving capital punish-
ment;66 but it was not until 1963, in Gideon v. Wainwright,6 7 that
the Supreme Court held that each state criminal defendant charged with
a serious crime, presumably defined as an offense subject to a significant
penalty, has a constitutional right to appointed counsel, without -re-
gard to whether the circumstances in his case are so compelling as to
render trial without legal counsel unfair. In the Supreme ,Court's judg-
ment, availability of counsel is, as a matter of law, absolutely essential
to the fairness of criminal proceedings.
There are several reasons why the Court came -to this conclusion
and therefore required extension of the right to counsel to state
criminal proceedings of a serious nature. First, in the Court's view,
the necessity for counsel springs from the essential characteristics of
our legal system which, unlike some others, is adversary in structure.
Basically, this means that parties to a dispute (in criminal cases, the
state and the defendant) come into court and engage in the personal
combat of probing and adducing the facts through examination and
cross-examination of witnesses6" and the introduction of real evi-
dence under strict rules of admissibility. The system is structured so
that it is, in a very real way, each man or combatant for himself. No
magistrate sits, as in continental systems, to participate actively and
to weight the scales for abstract truth and justice. By requiring the
appointment of counsel for indigents, the Supreme Court has in effect
recognized that the process is exceedingly complex and is highly de-
pendent for its accuracy, and consequently both for -its fairness and
for its appearance of fairness, upon the availability to each of the
contestants of trained and skilled experts or champions - lawyers - to
press each side's case.
The second principle underlying and ultimately promoted by the
right to counsel decisions is closely wedded to the first. Specifically,
ours is an accusatory rather than an inquisitory system. Simply put,
this means that the prosecution is charged with proving the criminal
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt without compelling the
defendant to convict himself out of his own mouth. 9 As noted earlier,
proof of guilt must be adduced in the course of proceedings during
which all witnesses are subject to confrontation, including not only
65. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
66. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
67. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
68. Compare Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (sixth amendment right to
confrontation absorbed into the fourteenth amendment). Lately there has been some
movement to ameliorate the purely competitive character of the adversary system. For
example, the recent amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide
for increased discovery in criminal proceedings. See FEDo. R. CRIM. P. 16. As to the
possibility that conditioning discovery of the government's case on discovery of the
defendant's case may violate the privilege against self-incrimination, see 86 S. Ct. No.
11 (Supp.) p. 208 (Feb. 28, 1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part from the proposed
rules for criminal procedure). See also Comment, 35 FORDHAM L. Riv. 315 (1966).
69. See, e.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) ; Malloy v. Hogan, 378




direct, but also challenging cross-examination.7" Unquestionably, ef-
fective examination of witnesses demands competent counsel. Thus,
the Supreme Court has ruled that legal representation must be available
at trial. And, to preserve further the integrity of the accusatory charac-
ter of our system, the Court ruled in Massiah v. United States that
after indictment, at which time 'formal proceedings are entered against
him, an accused may not be interrogated by agents of the government,
in the absence of his counsel.7 ' Then, to over-simplify, the Court also
ruled in Escobedo v. Illinois that when the police "process shifts from
investigatory to accusatory - when its focus is on the accused and
its purpose is to elicit a confession - our adversary system begins
to operate, and, under the circumstances here [in the case the Court
was then deciding], the accused must be permitted to consult with his
lawyer."7 " A confession or statement resulting from an interrogation
in violation of this right was held to be inadmissible in a criminal
proceeding against the accused. The last two rulings were made in
cases in which the accused had already procured his own attorney and
were specifically based on the sixth and fourteenth amendments' right
to counsel.
Last year the Court pushed the lesson further, protecting indigents
as well as those with retained counsel, by erecting the fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination, in addition to the sixth
amendment right to counsel, as a major barrier to the admissibility of
statements that result from custodial interrogation. In the landmark
case entitled Miranda v. Arizona -the Court held that :
[T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory
or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the
defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards
effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By
custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way. As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless
other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons
of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to
exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any
questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to
remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as
evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of
an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive
effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made volun-
tarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any
70. See Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.
400 (1965) ; see also Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959) ; 5 WIGMOR8, EVIDANCP
§ 1367 (3d ed. 1940).
71. 377 U.S. 201 (1964) ; but cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966)
Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966) (use of informers and introduction of
evidence garnered by them prior to indictment not prohibited entirely).
72. 378 U.S. 478, 492 (1964).
73. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult
with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning.
Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner
-that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not ques-
tion him. The mere fact that he may have answered some ques-
tions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive
him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries
until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents
to be questioned.74
The Supreme Court rulings, it must be stressed, exclude an ac-
cused's confessions or statements from his trial without regard to
veracity or -reliability as evidence. In addition, the decisions could not
have been made in ignorance of the possibility that many lawyers
may still act in conformity to the view, expressed by Justice Jackson
more than a decade ago, that "under our adversary system, he [a
lawyer] deems that his sole duty is to protect his client - guilty
or innocent - and that in such a capacity he owes no duty whatever
to help society solve its crime problem. Under this conception of
criminal procedure, any lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect
in no uncertain terms to make no statement to police under any
circumstances." 75 Despite the risks, the Court's rulings were made
and were imposed upon the states in the interest of the values that
underlie our adversary-accusatory system of criminal justice. And,
more than that, or perhaps concomitantly, the Miranda decision in
particular, which followed a long history of decisions excluding invol-
untary confessions, 6 was made because the Court agrees with Dean
Griswold of the Harvard Law School that the privilege against self-
incrimination is "one of the great landmarks in man's struggle to
make himself civilized." '77
74. Id. at 444-45. To this passage, Chief Justice Warren dropped a footnote
which said: "This [custodial interrogation] is what we meant in Escobedo where we
spoke of an investigation which had focused on an accused," 384 U.S. at 444 n.4.75. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). See also Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the CriminalDefense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MicH. L. Rzv. 1469 (1966). The
available evidence indicates, however, that despite Miranda there has as yet been no
significant decrease in the number of confessions. Zion, "So They Don't Talk," N.Y.
Times, August 21, 1966, § E (The News of the Week in Review) p. 13, col. 1.
Moreover, it is notable that the Miranda decision has thus far not prevented the re-
conviction of the Miranda defendants: see Time, March 3, 1967, p. 49.
76. See, e.g., Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966) ; Chambers v. Florida,
309 U.S. 227, 237-40 (1940) ; Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936).
77. GRiswoi.n, TH FirT AMENDMENT TODAY 7 (1955). See also Tehan v.United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 415 (1966) (quoted note 34 supra).
The recent ascendency of the fifth amendment protection against self-incrimi-
nation is marked in numerous other ways, not directly related to the right to counsel,but worthy of passing comment here. First, a couple of years ago the Court decided
that the privilege is imposed on the states as well as on the federal government and
the same generous standards of protection are binding on the state and federal govern-
ments. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). Second, it ruled that a grant of immunity
made by either the federal or state government is binding upon the other government.
Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52 (1964); see Comment, 20 RUTcERSL. REv. 336-49 (1966). Third, the Court held that the privilege prohibited comment
on the fact that a defendant chose to exercise his right to decline to testify at his
own trial. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). And obviously defendants often
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A number of matters remain to be clarified under the Miranda and
Escobedo decisions.7" For example, all of the stages at which counsel
is required have not yet been determined. In particular, ;it :is not yet
known, with great certainty, at ,what point a suspect is "arrested,"
thereby requiring that he be apprised of his rights and afforded the
assistance of counsel, appointed if necessary.7 9 Fortunately, on the other
hand, the 'Court did a great deal to resolve a second -series of questions,
decline to testify in order to avoid being subjected to the prosecution's probing cross-
examination - either for fear of incriminating themselves or for fear that they will
be impeached, for example, with their own prior criminal records. Fourth, on the
same day that it decided Miranda, the Court announced that vitality continues in the
principle that involuntary confessions (confessions that appear to have been physically
or psychologically coerced as a matter of fact) are inadmissible and cannot be used in
criminal proceedings against the one who made the confession. Davis v. North Carolina.
384 U.S. 737 (1966). Fifth, the Court invalidated procedures whereby contested
confessions were brought to the attention of juries prior to final determination of their
voluntariness. Boles v. Stevenson, 379 U.S. 43 (1964) ; Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S.
368 (1964). Sixth, compulsory registration as a member of the Communist Party of
the United States was prohibited as violative of the privilege against self-incrimination
since knowing and active membership in the Communist Party is subject to criminal
sanctions. Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965). And
the Court has decided to reconsider its earlier ruling upholding compulsory registra-
tion, as an incident to a taxing statute, of gamblers who are often violating state, local,
or federal law. (The earlier decision is United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22
(1953)). See Marchetti v. United States, cert. granted, 385 U.S. 1000 (1967);
Grosso v. United States, cert. granted, 385 U.S. 810 (1966). These cases were
briefed and argued during the October Term, 1966. See 35 U.S.L. WEEK 3252 (U.S.
Jan. 17-18, 1967). At the end of the Term, however, they were restored to the docket
for reargument at the October Term, 1967. 35 U.S.L. WEEK 3436-37 (Nos. 38 & 181,
U.S. June 12, 1967). Finally, during this past Term, the Court ruled that the
privilege against self-incrimination, applicable to the states, "prohibits use in subse-
quent criminal proceedings of statements obtained under threat of removal from
office, and that it extends to all, whether they are policemen or other members of our
body politic." Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967). Moreover, the Court
also ruled that the disbarment of an attorney, based upon his refusal to testify and
produce financial records before a state judicial inquiry into unethical practices,
violated his privilege against self-incrimination. Spevak v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
According to the Court, however, "Whether a policeman, who invokes the privilege
when his conduct as a police officer is questioned in disciplinary proceedings, may
be discharged for refusing to testify is a question we do not reach." Id. at 516 n.3.
In one respect the Court recently limited the possible scope of the privilege
against self-incrimination. In particular, it has ruled that the privilege "protects an
accused only from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide
the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature.... ." It only
reaches compulsion of "an accused's communications, whatever form they may take,
and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, com-
pliance with a subpoena to produce one's papers," and not "compulsion which makes
a suspect or accused the source of 'real or physical evidence'....." Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 761, 763-64 (1966) (taking of an unconsented blood test
from a suspected drunken driver does not violate the privilege); United States v.
Wade, 35 U.S.L. WEPK 4597, 4598 (U.S. June 12, 1967) (requirement that a suspect
appear and speak in a lineup does not violate the privilege) ; Gilbert v. California,
35 U.S.L. WgEK 4614, 4615 (U.S. June 12, 1967) (taking of handwriting exemplars
from a suspect does not violate the privilege).
78. Generally unresolved, for example, is the question whether the fruits of a
coerced confession or one in violation of the Miranda rule, as well as the confession
itself, must be excluded from criminal proceedings. See People v. Dilson, 57 Cal. 2d
415, 309 P.2d 714 (1962) (exclusion of real evidence obtained as a result of a
coerced confession).
79. See note 74 supra; see also, e.g., United States v. Kauffman, 35 U.S.L. WEEK
2497 (D. Hawaii, Feb. 2, 1967); United States v. Knight, 261 F. Supp. 843 (E.D.
Pa. 1966); United States v. Spinney, 264 F. Supp. 774 (D. Mass. 1966); United
States v. Fiore, 258 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. Pa. 1966) ; People v. Colleran, 35 U.S.L.
WEEK 3540 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. March 13, 1967).
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concerning whether a defendant is denied his fifth or sixth amendment
rights, for example, 'by his forced appearance, in the absence of coun-
sel, in a lineup during which he is compelled to speak. Declining to
extend Miranda, the Court ruled that compulsion to appear and speak
in a lineup does not violate the privilege against self-incrmination, nor
does the taking of handwriting exemplars from a suspect."0 The Court
also held that the taking of ,handwriting exemplars is not a critical stage
in the proceedings, at which the right to counsel attaches; but, building
on Escobedo, which has an essence independent of Miranda, .it did rule
that a lineup is a critical -stage at which the presence, assistance, and
advice of counsel can be of significant use to the accused."' Conse-
quently, the Court held that the right to counsel attaches at the lineup
stage of criminal proceedings and -that identifications made at a lineup,
during which an accused has not been afforded his right to counsel, are
inadmissible at trial. In addition, 'when such a lineup has taken place,
but evidence of identifications made at it are not introduced at trial,
it must still be decided, on a case-by-case evaluation of all the circum-
stances, whether the defective lineup nevertheless tainted other ,identifi-
cations made or introduced at the trial.
EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW
An additional principle that also bottoms the right to counsel
decisions arises from the constitutional admonition that our govern-
ments must afford all individuals "the equal protection of the laws." 2
It will be recalled that it was pursuant to this equality concept that
the Supreme Court struck down government-supported racial dis-
criimnation 5 and articulated the fundamental doctrine of "one man-
one vote."'8 4 Just as race and urban residence were declared to be
80. United States v. Wade, 35 U.S.L. WtFK 4597 (U.S. June 12, 1967) ; Stovall
v. Denno, 35 U.S.L. WxEK 4610 (U.S. June 12, 1967) ; Gilbert v. California, 35 U.S.L.
WESK 4614 (U.S. June 12, 1967).
81. Cases cited, supra note 80. The rule is limited to prospective application.
Stovall v. Denno, supra note 80; discussed supra note 60. The basis upon which the
Court distinguishes between lineups and other information gathering processes is
revealed in a paragraph in the Wade decision, where Justice Brennan, who delivered
the opinion of the Court, wrote:
The Government characterizes the lineup as a mere preparatory step in the
gathering of the prosecution's evidence, not different - for Sixth Amendment
purposes - from various other preparatory steps, such as systematized or
scientific analyses of the accused's fingerprints, blood sample, clothing, hair, and
the like. We think there are differences which preclude such stages being
characterized as critical stages at which the accused has the right to the presence
of his counsel. Knowledge of the techniques of science and technology is suffi-
ciently available, and the variables in techniques few enough, that the accused
has the opportunity for a meaningful confrontation of the Government's case at
trial through the ordinary processes of cross-examination of the Government's
expert witnesses and the presentation of the evidence of his own experts. The
denial of a right to have his counsel present at such analyses does not therefore
violate the Sixth Amendment; they are not critical stages since there is minimal
risk that his counsel's absence at such stages might derogate his right to a fair
trial. 35 U.S.L. WxiK at 4600.
82. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV. See generally Goldberg, Equality and Govern-
mental Action, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rtv. 205 (1964).
83. E.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ; Boiling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497 (1954).
84. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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invalid criteria upon which to make many distinctions, the Supreme
Court's ruling that indigents are constitutionally entitled to appointed
counsel is rooted partially in the judgment that it is invidious dis-
crimination to permit a man to be tried without the legal representation
so critical to his defense, merely because he is poor. Although implied
in the basic right to counsel case, Gideon v. Wainwright,8 this prin-
ciple was made more overt in a case decided the same day in 1963,
where the Court ruled that on the first appeal from criminal convic-
tions the state must make counsel available to all indigents.8 6 In
addition, in an earlier case, one decided in 1956, the Court also ruled,
on equal protection grounds, that indigents appealing from criminal
convictions must be provided trial transcripts at state expense, at least
where allegations that manifest errors occurred at trial are not de-
nied."' And indigent access to proceedings for collateral attack on
sentences of conviction has also been required.""
In the near future, we can expect considerably further refinement
of the extent to which the law, particularly in criminal proceedings,
must assure even-handed treatment of rich and poor alike. For example,
it remains to be decided in precisely what kinds of cases appointment
of counsel is required.8" Also to be more fully resolved is the question
of what other services must be made available to indigent criminal
defendants. Investigators? Psychiatrists? Scientific experts? Standards
of indigency must also be worked out. How poor must a man be?
How are we to avoid free-loaders? Under the pressure of the right
to counsel decisions, increased attention will also have to be paid to
questions of adequacy of counsel.9" Some way must be found to assure
85. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
86. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) ; see also, e.g., Anders v. Cali-
fornia, 87 S. Ct. 1398 (1967) ; Swenson v. Bosler, 386 U.S. 258 (1967) ; Hardy v.
United States, 375 U.S. 277 (1964).
87. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); see also, e.g., Entsminger v. Iowa,
87 S. Ct. 1402 (1967); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Norvell v.
Illinois, 373 U.S. 420 (1963).
88. Nowakowski v. Maroney, 87 S. Ct. 1197 (1967) ; Long v. District Court of
Iowa, 385 U.S. 192 (1966).
89. Over dissent, the Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in two mis-
demeanor cases in which appointment of counsel had been denied. Winters v. Beck,
385 U.S. 907 (1966); DeJoseph v. Connecticut, 385 U.S. 982 (1966). See also
People v. Hamilton, 271 N.Y.S.2d 694 (1966) (right to counsel upheld in probation
violation proceedings) ; Mempa v. Rhay and Walkling v. Rhay, 386 U.S. 907 (1967)
(cert. granted, appointment of counsel had been denied in probation proceedings);
State v. Snyder, 180 Neb. 787, 146 N.W.2d 67 (1966) (defendant not entitled to
presence of counsel at psychiatric examination) ; Harris v. Ogilvie, 35 Ill. 2d 512, 221
N.E.2d 265 (1966) (right to counsel upheld in habeas corpus proceeding brought
pursuant to Uniform Criminal Extradition Act) ; Nichols v. State, 425 P.2d 247
(Alaska 1967) (same) ; La Clair v. United States, 374 F.2d 486, 489 (7th Cir. 1967)
("appointment of counsel for indigents in habeas corpus and section 2255 proceedings
rests in the sound discretion of district courts unless denial would result in funda-
mental unfairness impinging on due process rights"). New York has gone particu-
larly far in requiring appointment of counsel. See, e.g., People v. Witenski, 15
N.Y.2d 392, 207 N.E.2d 358 (1965) (theft of two dollars worth of apples from an
orchard - fifty days imprisonment).
90. See, e.g., Martin v. Virginia, 365 F.2d 549, 552 (4th Cir. 1966) ("... a
lawyer's duty in representing a person charged with crime may not be discharged
perfunctorily or mechanically") ; Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation
as a Ground for Post Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. Rev. 289
(1964); Comment, 39 WASH. L. Rev. 819 (1964); Comment, 20 Sw. L.J. 136 (1966);
Comment, 49 VA. L. Rnv. 1531 (1963).
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that ind-igents have been adequately represented, while simultaneously
avoiding the promotion of a burdensome boiler plate contention to be
made in all post-conviction challenges. Some of these questions will be
resolved, and new questions will arise while our society continues,
for example, as under the Federal Criminal Justice Act of 1964,91 to
attempt to provide for adequate legal representation of indigents
by developing systems of public defenders or of compensation for
private counsel, in order to reduce the tremendous burden of repre-
senting the poor that heretofore has been borne primarily by unre-
munerated individual attorneys. The equal protection revolution in
criminal proceedings has already given rise to intensive -re-examination
of our bail system,92 with the passage of the Federal Bail Reform
Act of 1966"3 and a proliferation of programs, in Baltimore among
other cities, to administer wholesale release of accused persons on
their own recognizance pending trial. Moreover, the equality revolution
has already spread from the criminal arena into the realm of general
legal services for the poor; for one important aspect of the War on
Poverty is, as we lawyers must know, the establishment of programs
to render legal services more accessible to the poor.94
FURTHER AREAS FOR DEVELOPMENT
Many other developments will continue or begin, assuring the
fairness and efficacy of our systems of criminal law within our society's
fundamental value structure. Notably, the Court this Term ruled -that
the sixth amendment guarantee of a speedy trial is applicable to the
states.9 5 In addition, the question whether the fourteenth amendment
has absorbed the fifth amendment's prohibition against trying a person
more than once for the same offense, thereby protecting individuals
from being worn-down by the state, is likely to be reconsidered soon.
96
91. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1965).
92. See, e.g., Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail, 113 U. PA. L. Rgv.
959 (1965) ; Part II, 113 U. PA. L. Rzv. 1125 (1965).
93. U.S. PuB. L. 465, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., June 22, 1966. Efforts are also being
made to alter practices of jury selection so they may be more representative, racially,
economically, and socially, of the entire community. See, e.g., Title I of the proposed
Civil Rights Act of 1966, S. 3296, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., introduced April 28, 1966;
H.R. 14765, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., introduced May 2, 1966. New bills containing jury
provisions have been introduced in the present Congress. See Title I, S. 1026, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 20, 1967) ; Title I, H.R. 5700, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb.
20, 1967).
94. See Derby, Public Legal Assistance in Baltimore City, 26 MD. L. Rsv. 328
(1966).
95. Klopter v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967). The Court has also granted
certiorari in a case raising a question of whether the states must afford trial by jury
in criminal cases. Bloom v. Illinois, 87 S. Ct. 1347 (1967).
96. Compare State v. Farmer, 48 N.J. 145, 224 A.2d 481 (1966) (the fourteenth
amendment absorbs the double jeopardy prohibition), with Commonwealth v. Kubacki,
208 Pa. Super. 523, 224 A.2d 80 (1966) (the fourteenth amendment does not absorb
the double jeopardy prohibition). During this Term, the Supreme Court heard argu-
ment on whether the non-absorption rule, which dates back to Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319 (1937), should be overturned. The Court, however, found that the issue was
not properly raised in the case. Cichos v. Indiana, 385 U.S. 76 (1966). If the Court
were to decide that the bar on double jeopardy applies to the states, it might then
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And the Court may soon pass on the constitutionality of the so-called
"stop and frisk" laws and practices. 97
Further elaboration can also 'be expected of the eighth -amend-
ment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Recently
this prohibition was ruled applicable to the states in a decision that
the status of narcotics addiction, which the Supreme Court defined as
a disease, is not sanctionable as a crime.9" Two United States Courts
of Appeals have extended that ruling to insulate the status of habitual
alcoholism from criminal sanction. 9  Not only has the prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment recently been used to bar pun-
ishment for acts declared not to be subject to criminal punishment, but
there are indications that renewed evaluation will ,be made -of the kinds
and caliber of punishment that may be available for imposition against
unquestionably "criminal" acts. Three Justices of the Supreme Court
have in fact indicated their desire to consider whether capital punish-
ment may 'be imposed with respect to offenses ,in which there 'is no loss
of or threat to human life.' 0 In addition, there is an increased move-
ment in the direction of assuring consistency and other fairness in
sentencing, with the increased possibility that, where appropriate, pro-
vision will be made for appellate review of sentencing.'
reconsider its decisions that acquittal (or conviction) by a state government does not
bar the federal government from trying a defendant for essentially the same offense
and vice-versa. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959) ; Abbate v. United States, 359
U.S. 187 (1959). It is perhaps notable that the Draft Constitution, recommended by
the Constitutional Convention Commission-of Maryland, includes in Section 1.10 of
the Declaration of Rights a prohibition against double jeopardy, whereas Maryland's
current Constitution includes no such prohibition. INTERIM REPORT OF THE CONSTI-
TUTIONAL CONVENTION COMMISSION: MARYLAND 1967 (May 26, 1967) pp. 2, 38.
97. Terry v. Ohio, cert. granted, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 3419 (U.S. No. 1161, May 29,
1967) ; Peters v. New York, prob. ]uris. noted, 87 S. Ct. 1291 (1967) ; Sibron v.
New York, prob. juris. noted, 386 U.S. 954 (1967); Wainwright v. New Orleans,
cert. granted, 385 U.S. 1001 (1967).
98. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
99. Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50, 52 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (alcoholism,
according to Judge Fahy, is a sickness accompanied by loss of "self-control," which
is "an essential element of criminality, where personal conduct is involved .. ");
Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966) (alcoholism). But the Supreme
Court, over dissent, recently refused to review a decision contrary to those in the
District of Columbia and Fourth Circuits. Budd v. California, 385 U.S. 909 (1966).
100. Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963) (Goldberg, Douglas, and Brennan,
J.J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari). Notably, at its last session, the Mary-
land Senate passed a bill abolishing capital punishment in most cases. The bill,
however, died in the House of Delegates. See Md. Sen. Bill No. 82, Jan. 24, 1967.
It is also significant that the American Civil Liberties Union has within the last couple
of years adopted the position that capital punishment is an unconstitutional depriva-
tion of civil liberties. Furthermore, federal district courts in California and Florida
have stayed all executions in those states pending adjudication of the cruel and
unusual punishment and due process questions. See N.Y. Times, July 11, 1967,
p. 20, col. 1. See THE POLICY GUIDE OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
No. 222 (June, 1966). As to cruel and unusual punishment generally, recently
Dean Pollak wisely observed, "There can be no doubt that the questions posed
by Justice Goldberg [in Rudolph], and cognate questions testing whether 'the punish-
ment fits the crime' will come before the Court with greater frequency and greater
urgency in future cases. Those future cases will, one by one, give further dimension
to the unfolding concept of due process of law." II POLLAK (ed.), THE CONSTITU-
TION AND THE SUPREME COURT 179 (1966) ; see also McWilliams, Cruel and Unusual
Punishments: Use and Misuse of the Eighth Amendment, 53 A.B.A.J. 451 (1967).
101. See MD. CODE ANN. art. 26, §§ 132-38 (1957) ; see also, e.g., STANDARDS
RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES (Tent. Draft, ABA Project on
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Criminal punishment of insane persons has long been considered
either to be cruel and unusual punishment or to be violative of due
process of law.' °2 Extensive re-examination, however, is being made
of the traditional tests of insanity, with the movement away from
the old M'Naghten right and wrong test (even as modified by the ir-
resistible impulse concept) in the direction of a more liberal notion of
what constitutes insanity or mental incapacity."0 3 The rise of the revolu-
tionary Durham -test,' which immunizes from criminal punishment
conduct that was proximately contributed to by some mental defect
or aberration, however, may be over. The movement now is more
toward the ALI test, ' 5 which in subtle fashion is not quite as ex-
pandable as the Durham test and therefore holds the individual more
responsible for his acts.' 6 The ALI test basically asks the question,
did the accused suffer mental incapacity, and, -because of -it, was he
substantially unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or
conform his conduct to the requirements of law?
While the restructuring of the test of insanity continues, we are
also witnessing a re-examination of the alternatives that have developed
over the years to incarceration and punishment of harmful persons as
criminals. Specifically, the question is mooted: Are systems of invol-
untary treatment and detention that are described as civil and/or
medical really different from systems of involuntary treatment that
are labeled "criminal" ?107 Recently, the entire notion of distinguishing
Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Inst. of Judicial Admin., April, 1967);
Appellate Review of Sentences: A Symposium at the Judicial Conference of United
States Court of Appeals for the second Circuit, 32 F.R.D. 249 (1962) ; Sobeloff, A
Recommendation for Appellate Review of Criminal Sentences, 21 BROOKLYN L. Rgv. 2(1955) ; Sobeloff, The Sentence of the Court: Should There Be Appellate Review?,
41 A.B.A.J. 13 (1955). Cf. Van Alstyne, In Gideon's Wake: Harsher Penalties and
the "Successful" Criminal Appellant, 74 YALE L.J. 606 (1965). Very recently the
United States Senate passed and sent to the House an appellate review bill.
102. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 668-69 (1962) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) ; United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 615 (2d Cir. 1966) ; Whalem
v. United States, 346 F.2d 812, 818 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (". . . the law is clear that one
whose acts would otherwise be criminal has committed no crime at all if because of
incapacity due to age or mental condition he is not responsible for those acts").
Recently the Supreme Court went so far as to rule that a state court must sua sponte
protect an accused from being tried while legally incompetent. Pate v. Robinson, 383
U.S. 375 (1966).
103. Recently in Pierce v. Turner, cert. denied, 386 U.S. 947 (1967), Justice
Douglas in dissent propounded a series of questions implying some doubt as to the
constitutionality of the M'Naghten test.
104. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1957). "It [the
rule] is simply that an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was
the product of mental disease or mental defect."
105. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1962) : "A person is not responsible for criminal
conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks
substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to con-
form his conduct to the requirements of the law." The A.L.I. test has been adopted in
several jurisdictions. See, e.g., United States v. Freeman, 357 F. 2d 606, 622 (2d
Cir. 1966). Recently, a bill providing for adoption was enacted by the Maryland
legislature and signed by the Governor. House Bill No. 15, § 9(a), 1967.
106. Even the progressive United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit has moved in this direction, edging away from its Durham ruling.
See, e.g., Whalem v. United States, 346 F.2d 812, 818 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
107. See Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ; Goldstein and Katz,
Abolish the "Insanity Defense" - Why Not?, 72 YA" L.J. 853 (1963).
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the incarcerated "treatment" of juveniles, "defective delinquents,"
and the insane, who have committed criminal offenses, from "punish-
ment" of such persons as criminals has been sharply challenged.
108
At a minimum, the debate is resulting in increased and salutary
application of constitutional safeguards to proceedings in which such
status is determined or continued.
At the end of the October, 1966 Term, in fact, the Supreme Court
ruled that the requirements of due process of law must be available in
any proceeding in which an accused may be adjudicated, and com-
mitted as, a juvenile delinquent.' ° In the case before it, the Court
had no occasion to decide whether all of the procedural safeguards
normally associated with our notions of due process of law must be
made available to the accused in such proceedings. Without necessarily
exhausting the range of likely protections, it did hold that the accused
is entitled to: adequate notice of the charges against him; notification
of his right to counsel and, if necessary, the appointment of counsel;
the protection of the privilege against self-incrimination; and the right
to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. It is especially im-
portant to note that the Court carefully limited the scope of its decision.
As Justice Fortas wrote for the Court:
We do not in -this opinion consider the impact of these con-
stitutional provisions upon the totality of the relationship of the
juvenile and the state. We do not even consider the entire process
relating -to juvenile "delinquents." For example, we are not here
concerned with the procedures or constitutional rights applicable
to the pre-judicial stages of the juvenile process, nor do we direct
our attention to the post-adjudicative or dispositional process....
We consider only the problems presented to us by this case. These
relate to the proceedings by which a determination is made as to
whether a juvenile is a "delinquent" as a result of alleged mis-
conduct on his -part, with the consequence that he may be com-
mitted to a state institution.
There is nothing in the Court's decision or opinion to indicate that,
when not actually involved in the determination-commitment stages
of juvenile proceedings, the states may not apply the more flexible and
informal procedures that may be believed to be consistent with the
philosophy that in juvenile proceedings, to be distinguished from
108. In Maryland, for example, the constitutionality of the Patuxent Institution
(where "defective delinquents" are incarcerated and treated) is being litigated in the
state and federal courts. See Daniels v. Director of Patuxent Institution, 238 Md.
80, 206 A.2d 726 (1965), after remand, 243 Md. 16, 221 A.2d 397 (1966) ; Murel v.
Director of Patuxent Institution, 240 Md. 258, 213 A.2d 576 (1965) ; Sas v. Maryland,
334 F.2d 506 (4th Cir. 1964).
109. In re Gault, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 1436 (1967); see also Kent v. United States,
383 U.S. 541 (1966) (District of Columbia law interpreted to require similar safe-
guards); Specht v. Patterson, 87 S. Ct. 1209 (1967) (due process, including right
to counsel, required at a hearing in which whether a sex offender is to receive an
indeterminate sentence under a Sex Offender Law rather than a specific term
prescribed for the offense committed is the issue).
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criminal proceedings, the state's benevolent and paternalistic purpose
is to pursue that which ,is for the good of the child. However, if the
states presume to premise their juvenile delinquency 'systems on "treat-
ment" rather than "punishment," -it is possible that the courts may
require that they do, in fact, "treat" their charges. The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 'has ruled that a person
involuntarily detained in a psychiatric hospital as a consequence of
a criminal proceeding can sue for an order that he in fact be treated."
FREE PRESS V. FAIR TRIAL
One additional area of activity is worth particular note. Heroic
efforts have been undertaken of late to accommodate the conflicts that
arise between our basic constitutional requirement that each criminal
defendant be afforded a fair trial before an.unbiased jury (or judge)
and our equally important constitutional guarantee of the broadest
possible freedom of speech and press, both to assure public information
and to assure the integrity of legal proceedings. The extent to which
these fundamental guarantees sometimes clash was made all too clear
during the days that followed the assassination of President Kennedy.
While the press was more than satisfying .the public's legitimate desire
to know what was going on, it may have destroyed all chance that either
Lee Harvey Oswald or Jack Ruby had for fair trials, if this entails
trial before a jury comprised of individuals who -have not predetermined
the issues in the case. The Supreme Court has in fact ruled that con-
victions may not stand where an inflamed press or mass media has
rendered improbable the securing of an unbiased jury, a jury that can
review the evidence adduced at the trial reasonably free from precon-
ceived judgment."' And the Court has also ruled that the conspicuous
presence of television and other broadcasting equipment at the trial
of Billy Sol Estes unconstitutionally interfered with the fair conduct
of his trial.'1 2 On the other hand, however, the Court has persistently
declined to permit any direct government bridling, in the interest of
fair trial, of out-of-court press activities. In particular, the Court has
not allowed injunctions or contempt citations to lie against out-of-court
publications or utterances."' But a bill was introduced in the 89th
Congress which would make it "contempt of [federal] court for any
110. See Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966); see also Lake v.
Cameron, 364 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Efforts are also being made to seal a
significant loophole in the federal criminal law and to provide for civil commitment
and treatment of criminal defendants acquitted in federal court on the grounds of
"insanity." See S. 3573, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., introduced by its sponsor, Senator
Tydings, on August 23, 1966; Tydings, A Federal Verdict of Not Guilty by Reason
of Insanity and a Subsequent Commitment Procedure, 27 MD. L. Ruv. 131 (1967).
111. See'Sheppard v. Maxwell 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373
U.S. 723 (1963) ; Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
112. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) ; see also Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384
U.S. 333 (1966).
113. See, e.g., Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947) ; Pennekamp v. Florida, 328
U.S. 331 (1946) ; Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
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employee of the United States, or for any defendant or his attorney or
the agent of either, to furnish or make available for publication informa-
tion not already properly, filed with the court which might affect the
outcome of any pending criminal litigation, except evidence that has
already been admitted at the trial. Such contempt shall be punished
by a fine of not more than $1000.""' In 1965, the Attorney General
issued regulations of a: similar tenor to govern the activities of em-
ployees of the Justice Department." 5 The Highest Court of New
Jersey has exercised similar restraint over -both prosecution and defense
attorneys, who are subject to the Court's supervision and sanction as
officers of the court,"" and -numerous other states have undertaken some
form of regulatory action" 7 Under the New Jersey approach, on pain
of disciplinary proceedings, attorneys, both prosecution and defense,
are prohibited from discussing pending criminal cases with reporters;
prosecution lawyers are- expected to exercise control over divulgement
by police officials.
While these efforts to control the Bar will be helpful, a satisfactory
resolution of the conflicts :between a free press and fair trials depends
upon regulation of the Fourth Estate as well. Sadly, however, there is
little indication that the reporting media will also exercise adequate
self-restraint,"" just as there appears to be little likelihood that the
motion picture and television industries will engage in adequate self-
regulation to restrict the output of the brutal and too starkly realistic
sado-masochistic junk with which we (and most disturbingly our chil-
dred) have been deluged for -too many years. If we are treated to many
more press spectacles such' as those following President Kennedy's as-
sassination and the murder of Dr. Sheppard's first wife, although not
very likely, the Supreme Court might be constrained to permit direct
suppression of such prejudicial press coverage of criminal proceed-
ings," just as it recently indicated that government regulation of
blatant sexual sado-masochism may be permissible.12 0
114. S. 290, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
115. 28 C.F.R. § 50.2 (Jan. 1, 1967).
116. State v. Van Duyne, 43 N.J. 368, 204 A.2d 841 (1964).
117. See, e.g., FREE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL 95-119 (American Newspaper Pub-
lishers Ass'n, Special Committee on Free Press and Fair Trial, 1967).
118. Compare FREE PREss AND FAIR TRIAL, op. cit. supra note 117 (study by
the newspaper lobby), with STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS
(Tentative Draft of the Ameritan Bar Ass'n Project on Minimum Standards for
Criminal Justice, 1967) and FREEDOM OV THE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL (Final Report
with Recommendations by the Special Commission on Radio, Television, and the
Administration of Justice of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
1967); see also the flurry over ground rules for the coverage of the trial of Richard
Speck, recently convicted of mass murder. E.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1967, p. 23,
col. 6.
119. Compare STANDARDS! "RELATING To FREE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL, supra
note 118. In England, of course, the press labors under direct government restriction
with respect to reporting of criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Groggin and Hanover,
Fair Trial v. Free Press: The Psychological Effect of Pre-Trial Publicity on the
Juror's Ability to be Impartial: A Plea for Reform, 38 So. CAL. L. REv. 672 (1965).
120. See Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966); see also Ginzburg v.




The development of an appropriate accommodation between the
principles of fair trial and of free speech will be interesting to observe,
particularly since it and the other developments touched upon earlier
will give us further insight into the interplay 'between the various
institutions in our society and between our Constitution and the funda-
mental values that continue to evolve in our complex civilization. The
processes we have brushed are indeed complicated, for in our age of
almost inconceivable flux and change, to address the topic of this
article is, in a fundamental sense, to ask and to face the questions:
where is our society; what are its characteristics; where is it going;
where has it been? The at first startling developments in the area of
criminal law and procedure to which the processes of interaction have
given rise in scarcely a decade are typical, not atypical; they involve
and embody the continual growth and rejuvenation of principle in our
maturing and urbanizing society. Moreover, they involve the pri-
mary use of the law, including constitutional law, as the main battle
field upon which are resolved a progressive society's twin needs for
stability and change.
On balance, there is much to approve of in the contemporary
winds and currents in criminal law and procedure. By accepting and
following through on them, we may be paying a price in loss of
continuity with past practices and in reduction of the diversity through
experimentation that might come from cleaving closer to a theoretical
model of federalism. But the change that we accomplish, with its
inexorable movement toward uniformity, is more than worth the cost.
The uniformity we approach is that of a maturing and humane civiliza-
tion, committed to the essentiality of the individual, to his integrity,
and to an order based upon notions of fairness and decency.
It is not amiss in closing to suggest, however, that in the area of
criminal procedure at 'least, far-reaching change may be expected to
come more slowly or less dramatically now than in the past decade
or so.' 21 Most of the central decisions, indicating the main directions
(1967); Holden v. Blankenship, 87 S. Ct. 1418 (1967); Blankenship v. Holden, 87
S. Ct. 1419 (1967).
121. Compare Clymer, High Court in Low Gear in Field Criminal Law, The Sun(Baltimore), Feb. 24, 1967, p. A6, col. 2. In one realm, generally outside of the
scope of this article, but having enormous consequences for our system of federalism,
we can still expect spectacular and accelerating change. Whether to fight organized
crime or to protect civil rights, the federal government is likely to intervene increas-
ingly to establish federal substantive criminal law where, in the past, state law stood
alone. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1965) (interstate travel or transportation in aid
of racketeering enterprises) ; Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings, The Attorney
General's Program to Curb Organized Crime and Racketeering, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.(1961); Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 5, House Judiciary Committee, Legisla-
tion Relating to Organized Crime, Serial No. 16, 87th Cong., ist Sess. (1961);
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedure, Senate Judiciary
Committee, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). Title V of the proposed (but not passed)
Civil Rights Act of 1966 (S. 3296, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., introduced April 28. 1966;
H.R. 14765, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., introduced May 2, 1966) ; Title V of the proposed
Civil Rights Act of 1967; S. 1026 and H.R. 5700, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., introduced
Feb. 20, 1967.
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for development (those, for example, involving right to counsel,
search and seizure, self-incrimination, 'and equality of access to criminal
justice) have already been made and are unlikely to be reversed. 22
Great and important decisions are still to come, but the changes,
particularly those wrought by courts, of the immediate future are likely
to involve primarily projection, consolidation, and refinement of prin-
ciples already well-announced. By its recent actions, the Supreme Court
has set in motion a kind of revolution, one that it now has carried
about as far as it can. Other institutions, however, such as the Ameri-
can Bar Association, with its project to establish minimum standards
for criminal justice, and the President's Commission on Law Enforce-
ment and Administration of Justice, are taking up the call, as they
must, and pressing on.
122. We cannot, I suppose, ignore the possibility, not great at this time, that
the Court might go beyond Miranda and Escobedo and simply exclude all out-of-court
confessions. See Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 498-99 n.5 (1967).
